Reductivism, Nonreductivism and Incredulity About Streumer’s Error Theory

Analysis 78 (4):766-776 (2018)
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Abstract

In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer argues via elimination for a global error theory, according to which all normative judgments ascribe properties that do not exist. Streumer also argues that it is not possible to believe his view, which is a claim he uses in defending his view against several objections. I argue that reductivists and nonreductivists have compelling responses to Streumer's elimination argument – responses constituting strong reason to reject Streumer’s diagnosis of any alleged incredulity about his error theory.

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N. G. Laskowski
University of Maryland, College Park

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