The Microstructure of Experience

Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (3):286-305 (2019)
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Abstract

I argue that experiences can have microphenomenal structures, where the macrophenomenal properties we introspect are realized by non-introspectible microphenomenal properties. After explaining what it means to ascribe a microstructure to experience, I defend the thesis against its principal philosophical challenge, discuss how the thesis interacts with other philosophical issues about experience, and consider our prospects for investigating the microphenomenal realm.

Author's Profile

Andrew Y. Lee
University of Toronto at Scarborough

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