Relevant Alternatives Contextualism and Ordinary Contingent Knowledge

Disputatio 2 (24):281-294 (2008)
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Abstract

According to David Lewis’s contextualist analysis of knowledge, there can be contexts in which a subject counts as knowing a proposition just because every possibility that this proposition might be false is irrelevant in those contexts. In this paper I argue that, in some cases at least, Lewis’ analysis results in granting people non-evidentially based knowledge of ordinary contingent truths which, intuitively, cannot be known but on the basis of appropriate evidence.

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Franck Lihoreau
New University of Lisbon

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