Relevant Alternatives Contextualism and Ordinary Contingent Knowledge
Disputatio 2 (24):281-294 (2008)
Abstract
According to David Lewis’s contextualist analysis of knowledge, there can be contexts in which a subject counts as knowing a proposition just because every possibility that this proposition might be false is irrelevant in those contexts. In this paper I argue that, in some cases at least, Lewis’ analysis results in granting people non-evidentially based knowledge of ordinary contingent truths which, intuitively, cannot be known but on the basis of appropriate evidence.Author's Profile
DOI
10.2478/disp-2008-0002
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2012-03-28
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2012-03-28
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