The doctrine of internal reasons

Journal of Value Inquiry 34 (4):507-516 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to advocates of internalism about reasons for action, there is an interesting connection between an agent’s reasons and the agent’s present desires. On the simplest version of this view, an agent has a reason to act a certain way at some time if and only if acting that way would promote his present desires. Let us call this the sub-Humean model.1 The sub-Humean model is widely regarded as too simple on the grounds that there are adverse conditions, such as massive confusion, in which desires are irrationally possessed or acquired, thereby failing to provide reasons for action.2

Author's Profile

Hallvard Lillehammer
Birkbeck College, University Of London

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
475 (#31,909)

6 months
40 (#81,628)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?