Radical Rationalization Accommodates Rampant Irrationality

Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 25 (1):53-73 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to a classic position in analytic philosophy of mind, we must interpret agents as largely rational in order to be able to attribute intentional mental states to them. However, adopting this position requires clarifying in what way and by which criteria agents can still be irrational. In this paper I will offer one such criterion. More specifically, I argue that the kind of rationality methodologically required by intentional interpretation is to be specified in terms of psychological efficacy. Thereby, this notion can be distinguished from a more commonly used notion of rationality and hence cannot be shown to be undermined by the potential prevalence of a corresponding kind of irrationality.

Author's Profile

Joachim Lipski
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München (PhD)

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-05-22

Downloads
255 (#62,110)

6 months
57 (#77,021)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?