Objectivism and Subjectivism in Epistemology

In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press (2017)
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Abstract

There is a kind of objectivism in epistemology that involves the acceptance of objective epistemic norms. It is generally regarded as harmless. There is another kind of objectivism in epistemology that involves the acceptance of an objectivist account of justification, one that takes the justification of a belief to turn on its accuracy. It is generally regarded as hopeless. It is a strange and unfortunate sociological fact that these attitudes are so prevalent. Objectivism about norms and justification stand or fall together. Justification is simply a matter of conforming to norms. In this essay, I shall make the case for objectivism about justification.

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Clayton Littlejohn
Australian Catholic University

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