Humean Laws and (Nested) Counterfactuals

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Abstract
Humean reductionism about laws of nature is the view that the laws reduce to the total distribution of non-modal or categorical properties in spacetime. A worry about Humean reductionism is that it cannot motivate the characteristic modal resilience of laws under counterfactual suppositions and that it thus generates wrong verdicts about certain nested counterfactuals. In this paper, we defend Humean reductionism by motivating an account of the modal resilience of Humean laws that gets nested counterfactuals right.
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Archival date: 2019-09-10
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Making Things Happen.Woodward, James
Causation: A User’s Guide.Paul, L. A. & Hall, Ned
Naturalness.Dorr, Cian & Hawthorne, John

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2019-09-05

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