Does Ordinary Morality Imply Atheism? A Reply to Maitzen

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Stephen Maitzen has recently argued that ordinary morality implies atheism. In the following, I argue that the soundness of Maitzen’s argument depends on a principle that is implausible, what I call the Recipient’s Benefit Principle: All else being equal, if an act A produces a net benefit for the individual on the receiving end of A, then one cannot have a moral obligation to prevent A. Specifically, the Recipient’s Benefit Principle (RBP) must be true if premise (2) of Maitzen’s argument is to be true. But, RBP is likely false, as it generates counterintuitive implications as well as conflicts with another principle both plausible and seemingly adopted by most of us, what I call the Preventing Immorality Principle: All else being equal, if an act A is seriously immoral, then one has a moral obligation to prevent A.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LOVDOM
Upload history
Archival date: 2012-07-08
View other versions
Added to PP index
2012-03-16

Total views
607 ( #9,283 of 2,445,677 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #28,562 of 2,445,677 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.