The Virtues of Hunting: A Reply to Jensen

Philosophy in the Contemporary World 13 (1):68-76 (2006)
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Abstract

In this paper, I attempt to demonstrate that environmental virtue ethics (EVE) fails to provide sufficient justification for the hunting of nonhuman animals. In order to do this, I examine an EVE justification for the hunting of nonhuman animals and argue that it gives rise to the following dilemma: either EVE justifies the hunting of both human and nonhuman animals, or it justifies the hunting of neither. I then submit that the first lemma ought to be rejected as absurd and, thus, that the second lemma ought to be embraced.

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Rob Lovering
College of Staten Island (CUNY)

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