Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics

Noûs 41 (3):355–393 (2007)
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Abstract

This paper offers an analysis of the logical form of plural action sentences that shows that collective actions so ascribed are a matter of all members of a group contributing to bringing some event about. It then uses this as the basis for a reductive account of the content of we-intentions according to which what distinguishes we-intentions from I-intentions is that we-intentions are directed about bringing it about that members of a group act in accordance with a shared plan.

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Kirk Ludwig
Indiana University, Bloomington

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