Foundations of Social Reality in Collective Intentional Behavior

In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Intentional Acts and Institutional Facts: Essays on John Searle's Social Ontology (2007)
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Abstract

This paper clarifies Searle's account of we-intentions and then argues that it is subject to counterexamples, some of which are derived from examples Searle uses against other accounts. It then offers an alternative reductive account that is not subject to the counterexamples.

Author's Profile

Kirk Ludwig
Indiana University, Bloomington

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