Intentions are Optimality Beliefs – But Optimizing What?

Erkenntnis 62 (2):235-262 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In this paper an empirical theory about the nature of intention is sketched. After stressing the necessity of reckoning with intentions in philosophy of action a strategy for deciding empirically between competing theories of intention is exposed and applied for criticizing various philosophical theories of intention, among others that of Bratman. The hypothesis that intentions are optimality beliefs is defended on the basis of empirical decision theory. Present empirical decision theory however does not provide an empirically satisfying elaboration of the desirability concepts used in these optimality beliefs. Based on process theories of deliberation two hypotheses for filling this gap are developed.

Author's Profile

Christoph Lumer
University Of Siena

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
565 (#25,995)

6 months
81 (#46,232)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?