Diachronic Dutch Book Arguments

Philosophical Review 121 (3):443-450 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The Reflection Principle can be defended with a Diachronic Dutch Book Argument (DBA), but it is also defeated by numerous compelling counter-examples. It seems then that Diachronic DBAs can lead us astray. Should we reject them en masse—including Lewis’s Diachronic DBA for Conditionalization? Rachael Briggs’s “suppositional test” is supposed to differentiate between Diachronic DBAs that we can safely ignore (including the DBA for Reflection) and Diachronic DBAs that we should find compelling (including the DBA for Conditionalization). I argue that Brigg’s suppositional test is wrong: it sets the bar for coherence too high and places certain cases of self-doubt on the wrong side of the divide. Given that the suppositional test is unsatisfactory, we are left without any justification for discriminating between Diachronic DBAs and ought to reject them all—including the DBA for Conditionalization
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MAHDDB-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-12-23
View other versions
Added to PP index
2012-07-26

Total views
176 ( #32,832 of 2,448,636 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #45,082 of 2,448,636 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.