Color-Consciousness Conceptualism

Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631 (2012)
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Abstract

The goal of the present paper is to defend against a certain line of attack the view that conscious experience of color is no more fine-grained that the repertoire of non- demonstrative concepts that a perceiver is able to bring to bear in perception. The line of attack in question is an alleged empirical argument - the Diachronic Indistinguishability Argument - based on pairs of colors so similar that they can be discriminated when simultaneously presented but not when presented across a memory delay. My aim here is to show that this argument fails

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Pete Mandik
William Paterson University of New Jersey

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