Roads to Necessitarianism

Matthew Mandelkern & Daniel Rothschild

Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (1):89-96 (2021) Copy BIBT_EX

Abstract

We show that each of three natural sets of assumptions about the conditional entails necessitarianism: that anything possible is necessary.

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Author Profiles

Matthew Mandelkern

New York University

Daniel Rothschild

University College London

Archival history

First archival date: 2019-06-25
Latest version: 2 (2020-03-17)
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Categories

Conditionals, Misc in Philosophy of Language

Indicative Conditionals, Misc in Philosophy of Language

Logic of Conditionals in Philosophy of Language

Truth-Conditional Accounts of Indicative Conditionals in Philosophy of Language

Keywords

conditionals Import-Export triviality results

Reprint years

2020

DOI

10.1007/s10992-020-09562-9

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2019-06-25

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