Seeing and Conceptualizing: Modularity and the Shallow Contents of Perception

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):267-283 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

After presenting evidence about categorization behavior, this paper argues for the following theses: 1) that there is a border between perception and cognition; 2) that the border is to be characterized by perception being modular (and cognition not being so); 3) that perception outputs conceptualized representations, so views that posit that the output of perception is solely non-conceptual are false; and 4) that perceptual content consists of basic-level categories and not richer contents.

Author's Profile

Eric Mandelbaum
CUNY Graduate Center

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-10-24

Downloads
1,272 (#8,096)

6 months
204 (#10,832)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?