Swamp Mary’s revenge: deviant phenomenal knowledge and physicalism

Philosophical Studies 148 (2):231-247 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Deviant phenomenal knowledge is knowing what it's like to have experiences of, e. g., red without actually having had experiences of red. Such a knower is a deviant. Some physicalists have argued and some anti-physicalists have denied that the possibility of deviants undermines anti-physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. The current paper presents new arguments defending the deviant-based attacks on anti-physicalism. Central to my arguments are considerations concerning the psychosemantic underpinnings of deviant phenomenal knowledge. I argue that physicalists are in a superior position to account for the conditions in virtue of which states of deviants constitute representations of phenomenal facts
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MANSMR-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-05-06
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
324 ( #14,099 of 51,473 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
33 ( #17,613 of 51,473 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.