Fitch’s Paradox, Stumbling Block or Touchstone for Knowability

Dissertation, Paris 1 (2012)
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If we want to say that all truths are knowable Fitch’s Paradox leads us to conclude that all truths are known. Is it a real philosophical problem or a mere modeling problem? Is it possible to express the idea of knowability using modal logic? The Knowability Principle is expressed by the formula: if Phi is true then it is possible to know that Phi. But what is the meaning of possibility in this context? Using standard modal operators under what condition can we express the idea of knowability? We will in particular examine the subjacent relations of the modal operators in a Kripke Model. We will define the possibility as the possibility of learning opposed to an unclear possibility. Then we will show that Fitch’s Paradox becomes clearer and we will examine how the Knowability Principle could be expressed in such frame.
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