Intentionality and the non-psychological

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4):531-54 (1986)
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Abstract

IT IS SHOWN IN DETAIL THAT RECENT ACCOUNTS FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONALITY AND MERELY CAUSALLY DISPOSITIONAL STATES OF INORGANIC PHYSICAL OBJECTS—A QUICK ROAD TO PANPSYCHISM. THE CLEAR NEED TO MAKE SUCH A DISTINCTION GIVES DIRECTION FOR FUTURE WORK. A BEGINNING IS MADE TOWARD PROVIDING SUCH AN ACCOUNT.

Author Profiles

Karl Pfeifer
University of Saskatchewan
Christian Martin
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

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