Modalizing Mechanisms

Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):658-670 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
It is widely held that it is unhelpful to model our epistemic access to modal facts on the basis of perception, and postulate the existence of a bodily mechanism attuned to modal features of the world. In this paper I defend modalizing mechanisms. I present and discuss a decision-theoretic model in which agents with severely limited cognitive abilities, at the end of an evolutionary process, have states which encode substantial information about the probabilities with which the outcomes of a certain Bernoulli process occur. Thus, in the model, a process driven by very simple, thoroughly naturalistic mechanisms eventuates in modal sensitivity
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-08-14
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
A Theory of the a Priori.George Bealer - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:29-55.
Ontic Structural Realism and Modality.Berenstain, Nora & Ladyman, James
The Perception of Probability.Gallistel, C. R.; Krishan, Monika; Liu, Ye; Miller, Reilly & Latham, Peter E.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
The Epistemology of Modality.Strohminger, Margot & Yli-Vakkuri, Juhani

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
253 ( #17,709 of 50,437 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #31,289 of 50,437 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.