Percezione, motivazione, esistenza. Intenzionalità e costituzione nella prima fenomenologia husserliana (1898-1921)

Dissertation, Università Degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" (2017)
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Abstract
The present work is a systematic study of the nexus which holds together perception, motivation and existence in Husserl’s early writings—precisely those which are dated between 1898 and 1921. In Chapter I a historical and conceptual reconstruction of the genesis of what is termed ‘constitution problem’ is provided. After a thorough discussion about the distinction between real and intentional description, we elucidate the method of phenomenological reduction and show how the constitution problem relates to questions regarding transcendence and existence. Chapter II is concerned with a detailed presentation of Husserlian phenomenology of visual perception. We present Husserl’s theory of intentionality in the light of Husserlian mereology: first, we argue that Husserl conceives of intentionality as a property which entails a relation; secondly, we debate his critique of the theory of immanent objects and his solution to the problem of non-existent objects. After examining the perceptual act in all its essential components (i.e. quality, matter and sensations), we discuss the notorious ‘content – apprehension’ schema and study the manuscripts in which Husserl develops the notion of ‘perceptional’. Themes like the relationship between fulfillment and disappointment and the distinguishability of veridical and non-veridical perceptions are also taken into account. In Chapter III we consider what differentiates the outer perception from other kinds of perception. After making clear what Husserl means by ‘inner perception’ we debate the opposition between immanent and transcendent perception, first by using identity/manifold analysis and then by means of whole/part analysis. In this context we reject Husserl’s account of reflection as a perceptual act on both exegetical and theoretical grounds. Furthermore, we explain how Husserl tries to refute the ‘image theory’ and how he addresses the issue of the hidden profiles. The study of the microstructure of the outer perception allows us to explain in which sense this kind of perception is to be conceived as necessarily inadequate. Chapter IV is largely devoted to an attempt at systematizing Husserl’s theory of kinaesthesia as it appears in the Dingvorlesung. This sheds light on the structure of motivation and on the role which this latter plays in the constitution of a mundane object. In Chapter V we scrutinize Husserl’s conception of the possibility/reality dichotomy. In particular, we distinguish an ontological analysis of possibility from a phenomenological one and investigate the diverse concepts of ‘possibility’ (e.g. ideal, real, independent, modal) developed by Husserl. Finally, we introduce and debate Husserl’s (so-called) ‘exhibition principle’ and try to point out its ambiguities.
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Archival date: 2017-04-01
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