Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):436-466 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recent work in the psychology of happiness has led some to conclude that we are unreliable assessors of our lives and that skepticism about whether we are happy is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. I argue that such claims, if true, have worrisome implications for procreation. In particular, they show that skepticism about whether many if not most people are well positioned to create persons is a genuine possibility worth taking very seriously. This skeptical worry should not be confused with a related but much stronger version of the argument, which says that all human lives are very bad and not worth starting. I criticize the latter stance, but take seriously the former stance and hope it can be answered in future work.

Author's Profile

Jason Marsh
St. Olaf College

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-05-29

Downloads
1,147 (#9,914)

6 months
151 (#19,118)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?