An Even Simpler Defense of Material Implication

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Abstract
Lee Archie argued that if any truth values are consistently assigned to a natural language conditional to which Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens are valid argumentative forms, and affirming the consequent is an invalid argumentative form, this conditional would have the same truth conditions than a material implication. This argument is simple and it requires few assumptions that are relatively uncontroversial. We show that it is possible to extend Archie’s argument to three-valued logics and five-valued logics and vindicate a slightly weaker conclusion, but that is still important: even if we would not believe in bivalence and in the classical negation operator, we would still have good reasons to accept that natural language conditionals and the material implication share truth conditions.
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First archival date: 2013-06-25
Latest version: 3 (2020-03-03)
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2013-06-25

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