Aim-Oriented Empiricism and the Metaphysics of Science

Philosophia 48 (1):347–364 (2019)
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Abstract

Over 40 years ago, I put forward a new philosophy of science based on the argument that physics, in only ever accepting unified theories, thereby makes a substantial metaphysical presupposition about the universe, to the effect it possesses an underlying unity. I argued that a new conception of scientific method is required to subject this problematic presupposition to critical attention so that it may be improved as science proceeds. This view has implications for the study of the metaphysics of science. The view has however been ignored by recent contributions to the field. I indicate broader implications of the view, and consider reasons why the view has been neglected.

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Nicholas Maxwell
University College London

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