More Troubles for Comesaña and Tal

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Abstract
Comesaña and Tal have used a contentious account of evidence possession to claim that an ``evidence of evidence is evidence'' principle of R. Feldman (EEE3) is (true but) trivial. We demonstrate to the contrary that, on the Comesaña--Tal account of evidence possession, EEE3 is false.
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First archival date: 2019-08-23
Latest version: 2 (2020-06-08)
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2019-08-23

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