Impermissive Bayesianism

Erkenntnis (S6):1-33 (2013)
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This paper examines the debate between permissive and impermissive forms of Bayesianism. It briefly discusses some considerations that might be offered by both sides of the debate, and then replies to some new arguments in favor of impermissivism offered by Roger White. First, it argues that White’s (Oxford studies in epistemology, vol 3. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 161–186, 2010) defense of Indifference Principles is unsuccessful. Second, it contends that White’s (Philos Perspect 19:445–459, 2005) arguments against permissive views do not succeed
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First archival date: 2013-05-13
Latest version: 2 (2013-10-13)
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An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Dogramaci, Sinan & Horowitz, Sophie
The Uniqueness Thesis.Kopec, Matthew & Titelbaum, Michael
Immoderately Rational.Horowitz, Sophie

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