Self-Relating Internalism: Reply to Vallicella

Metaphysica 22 (1):123-131 (2021)
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Abstract

William Vallicella (2020) puts forward three arguments against self-relating internalism, my theory of the unity of states of affairs. His first objection is that there can be no constituent of a state of affairs with the required unifying power given the need for ‘ontological analysis’, or at least that such an entity is mysterious. His second objection is that self-relating internalism violates the principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. His final objection is that my explanation of the unity of states of affairs is viciously circular. In this note, I argue that each of challenges can be met.

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Bo R. Meinertsen
University of Sheffield

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