Skeptical doubting and mindful self-reflection

In Mind, Language and Action. Papers of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 274-276 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The skeptic argues that we cannot have any external world knowledge because we cannot know that we are not brains in a vat. The intuitive appeal of this skeptical argument is essentially based on the comprehensibility of the process of skeptical doubting, where we focus our attention on our experiences and experience-based beliefs and raise questions about the sources of these experiences. I propose that skeptical doubting is an instance of a mental attitude that contemporary psychology characterizes as mindfulness. I suggest that mindful self-reflection is not a single phenomenon but rather a cluster of related phenomena that are characterized by an epistemic gap of one kind or the other. I conclude that the persuasiveness of the skeptical argument is based on undergoing the mental process of mindful self-reflection. The undesired skeptical results are gained by overemphasizing the epistemic force of this mental attitude.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MELSDA-4
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-12-21
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-12-21

Total views
83 ( #56,151 of 71,429 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #54,583 of 71,429 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.