Skeptical doubting and mindful self-reflection
In Mind, Language and Action. Papers of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 274-276 (2013)
Abstract
The skeptic argues that we cannot have any external world knowledge because we cannot know that we are not brains in a vat. The intuitive appeal of this skeptical argument is essentially based on the comprehensibility of the process of skeptical doubting, where we focus our attention on our experiences and experience-based beliefs and raise questions about the sources of these experiences. I propose that skeptical doubting is an instance of a mental attitude that contemporary psychology characterizes as mindfulness. I suggest that mindful self-reflection is not a single phenomenon but rather a cluster of related phenomena that are characterized by an epistemic gap of one kind or the other. I conclude that the persuasiveness of the skeptical argument is based on undergoing the mental process of mindful self-reflection. The undesired skeptical results are gained by overemphasizing the epistemic force of this mental attitude.
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2019-12-21
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83 ( #56,151 of 71,429 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #54,583 of 71,429 )
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