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Reliable Misrepresentation and Tracking Theories of Mental Representation
Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443 (2013)
Abstract
It is a live possibility that certain of our experiences reliably misrepresent the world around us. I argue that tracking theories of mental representation have difficulty allowing for this possibility, and that this is a major consideration against themAuthor's Profile
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Added to PP
2012-05-08
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2012-05-08
Downloads
1,981 (#4,283)
6 months
169 (#16,402)
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