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Three Reasons for Knowing Other than Knowing Otherwise: A Reply to Alexis Shotwell
PhaenEx 8 (1):267-275 (2013)
Abstract
In this article, I raise three potential objections to Alexis Shotwell’s view of “implicit knowledge,” which she presents in her book Knowing Otherwise.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2013-09-22
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312 (#50,808)
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74 (#55,230)
2013-09-22
Downloads
312 (#50,808)
6 months
74 (#55,230)
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