Intuitions, reflective judgments, and experimental philosophy

Synthese 195 (9):4147-4168 (2018)
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Abstract
Experimental philosophers are often puzzled as to why many armchair philosophers question the philosophical significance of their research. Armchair philosophers, in contrast, are often puzzled as to why experimental philosophers think their work sheds any light on traditional philosophical problems. I argue there is truth on both sides.
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First archival date: 2017-04-18
Latest version: 1 (2017-04-18)
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Against Some Recent Arguments for ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’: Reasons, Deliberation, Trying, and Furniture.Henne, Paul; Semler, Jennifer; Chituc, Vladimir; De Brigard, Felipe & Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter

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