Descartes' Conceivability Argument for Dualism

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Abstract
This paper examines Descartes conceivability argument for dualism and the reasons why it is or is not sufficient for establishing dualism. I first examine the conceivability argument by describing important context and stating its premises in plain language. I then offer a negative thesis of my own account. In doing so I will craft a rigorous argument which points out what is fallible in Descartes account, specifically the section that justifies (P3). I appeal to Priest’s writing on Descartes to elucidate this point about the falsehood of the premises that justify (P3). I end by explaining how Descartes' conceivability argument fails to establish dualism. Finally, I give an overview of the potential pros and cons of accepting dualism, and the pros and cons of rejecting dualism. Thereafter, the paper concludes with the expectation of having convinced the reader of the validity of its account of the conceivability argument.
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MIDDCA
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First archival date: 2021-03-15
Latest version: 3 (2021-04-02)
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2021-03-15

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