Prudence and Person-Stages

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Persons care about their future selves. They reason about their future selves’ interests; they plan for their future selves’ happiness and they worry about their future selves’ suffering. This paper is interested in the interplay between diachronic prudential reason and certain accounts of the metaphysics of personal identity that fall under the broad umbrella ‘conventionalist’. Some conventionalists conclude that under certain conditions there are intractable decisions for there is no fact of the matter regarding whether a person-stage ought (prudentially) to ϕ. This paper will suggest otherwise. These decisions are not intractable if we allow that it is sometimes rational for a person-stage to discount the utility of certain future person-stages. The paper then goes on to explore an alternative position that conventionalists might occupy which does not involve any such discounting: prudential relativism. According to prudential relativism it is impossible to offer a single, correct, answer to the question: should person-stage, P, ϕ at t? For according to prudential relativism there is no stage-independent stance from which to evaluate whether a person-stage ought to ϕ. Yet it is not, for all that, intractable, from P’s perspective, whether or not to ϕ.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MILPAP-5
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-08-26
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
How Things Persist.Hawley, Katherine
Well-Being and Time.Velleman, J. David

View all 14 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-10-18

Total views
82 ( #23,466 of 37,261 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #26,414 of 37,261 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.