Self-Locating Content in Visual Experience and the ‘Here- Replacement’ Account

Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to the Self-Location Thesis certain types of visual experiences have self-locating and so first-person (or de se), spatial contents. Such self-locating contents are typically specified in relational egocentric terms. So understood, visual experiences provide support for the claim that there is a kind of self-consciousness found in experiential states. This paper critically examines the Self-Location Thesis with respect to dynamic-reflexive visual experiences, which involve the movement of an object toward the location of the perceiving subject. The main aim of this paper is to offer an alternative interpretation of these cases which resists attributing them self-locating content, arguing for a replacement with a non-conceptual equivalent of the indexical ‘here’ (the h-replacement account). In its final section, the paper also considers an extension of the h-replacement account to cases of visual kinesthesis.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MITSCI-3
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-03-05
View other versions
Added to PP index
2021-03-05

Total views
49 ( #51,380 of 2,425,830 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
49 ( #15,877 of 2,425,830 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.