Too much substance – not enough cognition, commentary on Ruth Millikan: A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs and real kinds

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):80-81 (1998)
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Millikan's account of substance concepts is based on a notion of “substance” expanded from realist notions of individuals and natural kinds. Her metaphysical notion, based on “inductive potential,” is shown to be too puristic and needs to incorporate cognizing subjects. This could preserve the realist/nondescriptionist insight that the extension of substances is determined by the world.
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