Generic one, arbitrary PRO, and the first person

Natural Language Semantics 14 (3):257–281 (2006)
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Abstract

The generic pronoun 'one' (or its empty counterpart, arbitrary PRO) exhibits a range of properties that show a special connection to the first person, or rather the relevant intentional agent (speaker, addressee, or described agent). The paper argues that generic 'one' involves generic quantification in which the predicate is applied to a given entity ‘as if’ to the relevant agent himself. This is best understood in terms of simulation, a central notion in some recent developments in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (Simulation Theory).

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Friederike Moltmann
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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