Normes et jugements de valeur en ├ęconomie normative

Social Science Information 38 (4):521-553 (1999)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This paper discusses the nature of normative economics by distinguishing the alternative conceptions that economists have entertained in this respect. It attempts at connecting these conceptions with their philosophical sources, which essentially consist in variants of positivism and Weber's philosophy of values. The paper defends the claim that positive and normative economics differ from each other to the extent that the former does not, while the latter does, involve value judgments made by the theorist himself. This claim runs counter to the Weberian thesis of value-freedom that is implicitly endorsed by a majority of today's normative economists.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-10-06
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
194 ( #28,698 of 2,433,318 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #34,021 of 2,433,318 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.