Divine intentions and the problem of evil

Religious Studies 55 (2):1-20 (2019)
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Abstract
I develop a model of providence on which God brings about good states of affairs by means of evil states of affairs, but without intending the latter. The model's key ingredient is a backward-looking counterpart of the distinction between intended and merely foreseen consequences of an action: namely, a distinction between intended and merely foreseen means to an end. The model enables greater-good theodicies to avoid worries about whether a perfect being could intend evil.
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Archival date: 2019-05-15
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2018-09-27

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