How God Knows Counterfactuals of Freedom

Faith and Philosophy 37 (2):220-229 (2020)
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Abstract

One problem for Molinism that critics of the view have pressed, and which Molinists have so far done little to address, is that even if there are true counterfactuals of freedom, it is puzzling how God could possibly know them. I defuse this worry by sketching a plausible model of the mechanics of middle knowledge which draws on William Alston’s direct acquaintance account of divine knowledge.

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Justin Mooney
University of Alberta

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