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If you're so smart why are you ignorant? Epistemic causal paradoxes
Analysis 62 (2):110-116 (2002)
Abstract
I describe epistemic versions of the contrast between causal and conventionally probabilistic decision theory, including an epistemic version of Newcomb's paradox.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2009-01-28
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412 (#39,401)
6 months
74 (#55,230)
2009-01-28
Downloads
412 (#39,401)
6 months
74 (#55,230)
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