La sindéresis como alternativa al problema de la brecha en Searle

Stoa 7 (14):07-26 (2016)
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Abstract

The objective of this paper is to analyze the problem proposed by John R. Searle in the third chapter of his work Rationality in Action (2003) about the gap or distance that mediates between a decision and action, and how it intends to solve through the concept of the Self. We believe that this explanation is insufficient in some aspects and introduce the term Synderesis (Συντηρηοη in Greek) as argumentative line to defend the existence of decisions not contingent but free from a Thomist perspective, in contrast to the proposal of the gap and the Self No-Humean. (Spanish)

Author's Profile

Fabio Morandín-Ahuerma
Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla México

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