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Psychology for cooperators
In Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein (eds.), Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. Cambridge University Press. pp. 153 (2001)
Abstract
I discuss what learned and innate routines of self and other attribution agents need to possess if they are to enter into cooperative arrangements as described game theoretically. I conclude that these are not so different from belief desire psychology as described by philosophers of mind.Author's Profile
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Added to PP
2014-01-30
Downloads
232 (#62,264)
6 months
48 (#77,385)
2014-01-30
Downloads
232 (#62,264)
6 months
48 (#77,385)
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