"Cognitive Penetrability" - Ch 3 of Seemings and Justification (Forthcoming)

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Abstract
In this chapter I introduce the thesis that perceptual appearances are cognitively penetrable and analyse cases made against phenomenal conservatism hinging on this thesis. In particular, I focus on objections coming from the externalist reliabilist camp and the internalist inferentialist camp. I conclude that cognitive penetrability doesn’t yield lethal or substantive difficulties for phenomenal conservatism.
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First archival date: 2019-08-19
Latest version: 17 (2019-11-05)
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2019-08-19

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