Is the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Compatible with Russellian Panpsychism?

Erkenntnis:1-21 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is a leading scientific theory of consciousness, which implies a kind of panpsychism. In this paper, I consider whether IIT is compatible with a particular kind of panpsychism known as Russellian panpsychism, which purports to avoid the main problems of both physicalism and dualism. I will first show that if IIT were compatible with Russellian panpsychism, it would contribute to solving Russellian panpsychism’s combination problem, which threatens to show that the view does not avoid the main problems of physicalism and dualism after all. I then show that IIT and Russellian panpsychism are not compatible as they currently stand, because of a problem which I will call the coarse-graining problem. After I explain the coarse-graining problem, I offer two possible solutions, each involving a small modification of IIT. Given either of these modifications, IIT and Russellian panpsychism may be fully compatible after all and jointly enable significant progress on the mind-body problem.
Reprint years
2018
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MRCITI
Revision history
First archival date: 2018-02-21
Latest version: 2 (2018-04-12)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Jackson, Frank

View all 62 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
A Consciousness-Based Quantum Objective Collapse Model.Okon, Elias & Sebastián, Miguel Ángel

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-02-21

Total views
1,370 ( #1,213 of 41,488 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
370 ( #892 of 41,488 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.