Can Hume Deny Reid's Dilemma?

Hume Studies (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Reid’s dilemma concludes that, whether the idea associated with a denied proposition is lively or faint, Hume is committed to saying that it is either believed or merely conceived. In neither case would there be denial. If so, then Hume cannot give an adequate account of denial. I consider and reject Powell’s suggestion that Hume could have advanced a “Content Contrary” account of denial that avoids Reid’s dilemma. However, not only would a Humean Content Contrary account be viciously circular, textual evidence suggests that Hume did not hold such an account. I then argue that Govier’s distinction between force and vivacity cannot help Hume. Not only did Hume fail to recognize this distinction, we can advance a variant of Reid’s dilemma even if we distinguish force from vivacity.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
NGUCHD
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-07-31
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-07-31

Total views
65 ( #43,113 of 54,517 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
65 ( #9,728 of 54,517 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.