The nature of motivation (and why it matters less to ethics than one might think)

Philosophical Studies 87 (1):87-111 (1997)
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Abstract

What my suggestion rules out – if it is right – is the project of using some thesis about the conative or cognitive nature of motivation to argue for some thesis in meta-ethics. [...] facts about human motivation can be captured equally well with conativist or cognitivist language. And if that is true, then nothing about motivation either implies or rules out internalist moral realism.

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Robert Noggle
Central Michigan University

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