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Modal realism, still at your convenience
Analysis 77 (2):299-303 (2017)
Abstract
Divers presents a set of de re modal truths which, he claims, are inconvenient for Lewisean modal realism. We argue that there is no inconvenience for Lewis.Author Profiles
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Added to PP
2017-09-12
Downloads
384 (#42,377)
6 months
66 (#62,001)
2017-09-12
Downloads
384 (#42,377)
6 months
66 (#62,001)
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