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Against causal descriptivism
Mind and Society 5 (1):78-84 (2006)
Abstract
Causal descriptivism and its relative nominal descriptivism are critically examined. It is argued that they do not manage to undermine the principal conclusions of the new theory of referenceAuthor's Profile
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Added to PP
2010-08-10
Downloads
897 (#14,314)
6 months
127 (#25,458)
2010-08-10
Downloads
897 (#14,314)
6 months
127 (#25,458)
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