Bayesian Models, Delusional Beliefs, and Epistemic Possibilities

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The Capgras delusion is a condition in which a person believes that an imposter has replaced some close friend or relative. Recent theorists have appealed to Bayesianism to help explain both why a subject with the Capgras delusion adopts this delusional belief and why it persists despite counter-evidence. The Bayesian approach is useful for addressing these questions; however, the main proposal of this essay is that Capgras subjects also have a delusional conception of epistemic possibility, more specifically, they think more things are possible, given what is known, than non-delusional subjects do. I argue that this is a central way in which their thinking departs from ordinary cognition and that it cannot be characterized in Bayesian terms. Thus, in order to fully understand the cognitive processing involved in the Capgras delusion, we must move beyond Bayesianism. 1 The Simple Bayesian Model2 Anomalous Evidence and the Capgras Delusion3 Impaired Reasoning4 Setting Priors5 Epistemic Modality6 Delusions of Possibility7 Delusions of Possibility in Different Contexts8 How Many Factors?
Reprint years
2016
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PARBMD
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-11-21
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2014-12-06

Total views
158 ( #21,177 of 43,949 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #25,191 of 43,949 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.