The Anti-Induction for Scientific Realism

Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):329-342 (2018)
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In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. In this paper, I construct a new argument for scientific realism which I call the anti-induction for scientific realism. It holds that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. I provide an example from the history of science to show that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has several advantages over the no-miracles argument as a positive argument for scientific realism.
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First archival date: 2017-11-01
Latest version: 5 (2018-08-10)
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